Evan Thompson, WHY I AM NOT A BUDDHIST by Williams, Louise
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 37 Issue 4 Article 12 
10-1-2020 
Evan Thompson, WHY I AM NOT A BUDDHIST 
Louise Williams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Williams, Louise (2020) "Evan Thompson, WHY I AM NOT A BUDDHIST," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of 
the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 37 : Iss. 4 , Article 12. 
DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.4.12 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol37/iss4/12 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
550 Faith and Philosophy




Why I Am Not a Buddhist, by Evan Thompson. Yale University Press, 2020. 
Pp. i + 230. $18 (hardcover).
LOUISE WILLIAMS, University of Notre Dame
While the title of Evan Thompson’s Why I Am Not A Buddhist suggests that 
this book will give some reasons to broadly reject Buddhism, it turns out 
the majority of the text is focused on the failures of a specific contemporary 
flavor of the tradition: Buddhist modernism. This flavor, sometimes called 
neural Buddhism or secular Buddhism, is committed to what Thompson 
identifies as Buddhist exceptionalism:
Buddhist exceptionalism is the belief that Buddhism is superior to other 
religions in being inherently rational and empirical, or that Buddhism isn’t 
really a religion but rather is a kind of “mind science,” therapy, philosophy, 
or way of life based on meditation (2).
Although not explicitly stated, Thompson suggests that one of the major 
ways that Buddhist modernism manifests this commitment to Buddhist 
exceptionalism is through associating religion with claims made on the 
basis of faith. Thus, much of Buddhist modernism is focused on illus-
trating that all Buddhist claims can be grounded in empirical facts rather 
than claims grounded in faith. Clearly there are other ways that one might 
distinguish between religion and these other categories (“mind science,” 
therapy, philosophy, or a way of life based on meditation), but from the 
way Thompson characterizes Buddhist modernism this seems to be the 
focus. Ultimately, Thompson rejects Buddhist modernism.
For Thompson, we can see that any palatable version of Buddhism 
has to meet two key criteria. First, it has to have enough philosophical 
machinery to answer a variety of pressing questions, many of which are 
grounded in internal concerns about the Buddhist worldview. Second, it 
has to accomplish this without depending on any faith claims. According 
to Thompson, Buddhist modernists’ attempt to remove faith from the 
Buddhist tradition is the right general move, but their particular execu-
tion leaves us with a version of Buddhism that is incapable of meeting the 
first requirement. Toward the end of the book, Thompson remarks that he 
is skeptical that any flavor of Buddhism could meet both of these criteria. 
On Thompson’s view, removing faith from Buddhism means simultane-
ously removing the foundation of much of the philosophical machinery 
holding the entire system up. Thus, we can understand the main rea-
son that Thompson is not a Buddhist is because of his broad rejection of 
faith claims.
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In general, Thompson’s book does a good job cashing out exactly what 
Buddhist modernism is and some of its major pitfalls. I  am quite sym-
pathetic toward the specific reasons Thompson gives for Buddhist mod-
ernism’s inability to provide satisfactory accounts of key concepts within 
the Buddhist tradition. In this review, I touch on Thompson’s reasoning 
regarding three major concepts in Buddhism: no-self, mindfulness medi-
tation, and Enlightenment.
I think a more surprising aspect of Thompson’s text is that he identifies 
faith as having such a foundational role in the Buddhist tradition. Perhaps 
it is just the prevalence of Buddhist exceptionalism, or the general suspi-
cion many folks express toward religions that are better known for their 
reliance on faith, but Buddhism definitely does not have a reputation for 
its reliance on faith. I think a major shortcoming of the text is that the dis-
cussion of faith is largely underdeveloped. There are two obvious points 
about faith that deserved more attention in the text. First, why think that 
the way to distinguish Buddhism from religion is through removing faith 
from the Buddhist tradition? This seems to be the move that the Buddhist 
modernist is attempting to pull off, but we are not given any clear reasons 
to think that this is the right way to distinguish Buddhism from other 
religions. Second, on what grounds does Thompson reject the faith claims 
of Buddhism? To this second point, Thompson reports that he does not 
believe the relevant faith claims, but he does not explain why that is the 
case. I suspect that doing so would have required a more elaborate dis-
cussion of what faith means in the Buddhist tradition. Such a discussion 
would have been helpful in unpacking Thompson’s main answer to why 
he is not a Buddhist.
Internal Problems with Buddhist Modernism. Much of Thompson’s 
book is dedicated to exploring ways in which Buddhist modernism’s 
attempt to read every aspect of the Buddhist tradition as empirically 
demonstrable leads to an incoherent version of Buddhism. In general, 
Thompson has two major strategies for accomplishing this. At times, 
Thompson provides in-principle reasons to think that Buddhist mod-
ernism’s account fails. Other times, Thompson argues that his own way 
of understanding key aspects of the Buddhist tradition are more suc-
cessful than the reading provided by the Buddhist modernist. As we 
know, Thompson is not a Buddhist, but he does take a lot of inspira-
tion from Buddhism, and may even go so far as accepting components 
of the Buddhist picture for his own worldview. The strongest parts of 
this discussion are when Thompson points out in-principle problems 
with the Buddhist modernist account. Thompson has developed sev-
eral fascinating, although somewhat controversial, ways of understand-
ing key claims from the Buddhist tradition. In this book, Thompson’s 
main goal is not to explain his positive account, so the brief overview 
he gives is often a bit underdeveloped. Readers who are unfamiliar with 
Thompson’s work may find themselves perplexed at his explanations in 
this text. I think that Thompson does a better job explaining his account 
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in his other works where presenting them is his main focus. Since this 
text is largely an exploration of why Buddhist modernism is false, I will 
restrict my review here to the in-principle problems Thompson puts for-
ward for the account.
One of the defining features of the Buddhist account is the claim 
that there is no self. The Buddhist modernist’s interpretation of the 
no-self doctrine is that the self is an illusion that is created by the brain. 
Thompson gives two major reasons that this interpretation fails for the 
Buddhist modernist: (1) it is overly simplistic and (2) “cognitive science 
doesn’t show that the self is an illusion. . . . Rather, it indicates that the 
self is a construction” (89). The first point has to do with the complex 
history around the development of the Buddhist philosophical system. 
This is especially focused on debates with non-Buddhist traditions who 
accuse the tradition of being a kind of nihilism about the self. Buddhist 
modernism fails to recognize any of the nuance of this debate and thus 
presents a very underdeveloped version of the no-self doctrine. Because 
the modernists’ version of no-self is so thin, it ultimately undermines the 
coherence of the account. The second point has to do with Thompson’s 
preferred way to understand evidence from cognitive science. As I said 
earlier, I  am bracketing Thompson’s positive account for purposes of 
this review.
Another major tenet that Buddhist modernism attempts to account 
for is mindfulness meditation. Buddhist modernism argues that mind-
fulness meditation is supposedly superior to any non-Buddhist forms 
of meditation because Buddhist mindfulness meditation “exists purely 
in the head” (139). Mindfulness meditation, according to the Buddhist 
modernist, is supposed to be something that can be measured and eval-
uated through the tools of neuroimaging. Thompson argues that this is 
a fundamental misunderstanding of what mindfulness meditation is. 
For Thompson, mindfulness meditation does not merely exist “in the 
head,” any more than parenting exists inside the brain. Mindfulness 
meditation “consists of certain emotional and cognitive skills and put-
ting those skills into play in the social world” (130). Here Thompson 
accuses Buddhist modernism of feeding into a kind of selfish indi-
vidualism which many Buddhists object to. It suggests that “all you 
really need to deal with is your own mind, not the larger social setting” 
(131). Ultimately, this individualism is “counter to the whole point of 
the Buddhist tradition” (131). Meditation is not about you going alone 
to manipulate your brain in certain ways. Meditation is about training 
yourself to become aware of different societal and environmental ele-
ments of the inner and outer world.
The goal of Buddhism is to help folks escape the cycle of suffering and 
reach Enlightenment. Every form of Buddhism must have some way to 
make sense of this goal state. As with all major concepts in the tradition, 
Buddhist modernism strives to explain Enlightenment in purely scientific 
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terms. They opt for understanding Enlightenment as a kind of psycho-
logical state. Thompson’s major objection to this strategy has to do with 
what that psychological state amounts to. In order to evaluate whether 
we can coherently make sense of Enlightenment as a purely psycholog-
ical state, we need to know, in some detail, the contents of that psycho-
logical state. For example, is it conceptual or nonconceptual? Answers to 
these questions can have profound philosophical implications when we 
look at the view as a whole. We need to know a lot of details in order to 
evaluate (1) if it makes sense to understand Enlightenment in terms of a 
psychological state and (2) if this reading produces a sufficiently robust 
state that we can maintain Enlightenment as the goal state of the entire 
tradition.
One of the major challenges for the Buddhist modernist here, according 
to Thompson, is related to the complex history of this problem within the 
Buddhist tradition. It is notoriously difficult to get a specific explanation 
of what Enlightenment amounts to across the Buddhist world. There is 
no consensus among various flavors of Buddhism that it is even possible 
to specify the content of Enlightenment let alone what that content might 
actually be. Buddhist modernists largely ignore these nuances from the 
tradition. Thus, they fail to give any kind of robust explanation as to why 
we should think that Enlightenment can be specified in the way required 
in order to evaluate their view.
Faith in Buddhism. It is in this discussion of Enlightenment that 
Thompson’s core insight about the nature of faith comes out the clearest. 
It is uncontroversial that the goal of Buddhism is to reach Enlightenment. 
We have to have a starting point for why we should seek out this goal 
state. Afterall, if it turns out that Enlightenment is kind of ho-hum, no one 
would ever have the prerequisite motivation to pursue the Buddhist path. 
Although Thompson doesn’t say this explicitly, I take it that the Buddhist 
modernist might think that the reason one should pursue the Buddhist 
path is because it is supported by empirical science. Thompson dedicates 
a chapter in his book to Why Buddhism is True by Robert Wright (Simon 
and Schuster, 2017) as an example of this kind of thinking. He ultimately 
dismisses this approach for two major reasons. First, he argues that asking 
whether Buddhism is right or wrong is not the right kind of question to 
ask. Second, the particular view put forward by Wright is heavily depend-
ent on a bunch of contentious philosophy of science issues. If Thompson’s 
arguments throughout the book are right, we can see that this general 
strategy falls a bit short. Reading the Buddhist tradition in purely empir-
ical terms fails to give us the robust philosophical machinery needed to 
support the Buddhist path.
Instead, Thompson argues that the main reason one should pursue 
Enlightenment is because one has faith that such a state is real and attain-
able. According to Thompson, this claim is the foundation to a lot of core 
philosophical insights from the Buddhist tradition. Thompson argues that 
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without this core foundation, there is no way to support the philosophical 
machinery that constitutes the Buddhist worldview.
Buddhist modernists’ commitment to Buddhist exceptionalism, along 
with their assumption that faith-based claims are unacceptable to a fla-
vor of Buddhism that is distinct from religion, means that Buddhist mod-
ernism cannot accept any faith-based claims in their system. Thompson 
suggests that this problem for the Buddhist modernist is a general prob-
lem for any version of Buddhism that fails to accept the foundational 
role of faith in the system. Thompson himself reports that he does not 
accept these faith-based claims about the reality of Enlightenment. He 
is skeptical that any coherent form of Buddhism could be articulated 
without these claims, and thus he cannot be a Buddhist.
Overall, Thompson’s book is an interesting exploration of why one 
might not accept the Buddhist worldview. His answer is fundamen-
tally if you don’t have faith in things like the reality of Enlightenment, 
then you cannot be a Buddhist. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the book 
is a bit too narrowly focused on Buddhist modernism. I generally find 
this flavor of Buddhism to be unpalatable because it tends to ignore the 
rich history of the Buddhist tradition before its recent encounters with 
science. It feels a bit too steeped in what I  call the “Buddhist Buffet” 
problem where we cherry-pick bits from various traditions that match 
nicely with our own prejudices and slap the label “Buddhism” on it. 
I take it Thompson would reject my reasoning on the grounds that con-
cerns about whether this is “authentically Buddhism” are generally mis-
placed since Buddhism is always an evolving tradition. But I found his 
arguments against analyzing traditions in terms of authenticity largely 
uncompelling.
If Thompson is right and Buddhism is importantly a faith-based tra-
dition, which I  am sympathetic to, then this is good news for scholars 
in philosophy of religion. If such scholars were wary of engaging with 
Buddhism because they were unsure of its relationship to religion, faith 
appears to be a clear bridge concept worthy of exploration. I’d recommend 
Thompson’s book for folks who are interested in unpacking some of the 
problems with one of the more popular forms of Buddhism today, but not 
for those looking for a broader analysis of Buddhism. For philosophers of 
religion, I would especially recommend checking out Paul Williams’s The 
Unexpected Way: On Converting from Buddhism to Catholicism (T. & T. Clark, 
2002) as a complement to Thompson’s book. Williams ultimately rejects 
Buddhism in favor of Catholicism not on the grounds of faith but largely 
because of Buddhism’s commitment to no-self.
